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I.

MISTAKE AS TO OWNERSHIP

OF PROPERTY

The most significant case during the Survey period is Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Forcum.1 The State of Tennessee condemned for highway purposes
certain property including the location of a filling station. Defendant
was lessee of this property and had installed its own tanks, pumps and
other equipment. Plaintiff had the contract to construct the highway
and was entitled under this contract to salvage condemned property.
Refusing to allow defendant's agent to remove the service station
equipment, plaintiff removed the equipment itself at considerable
expense. When the condemnation proceeding was completed, de-

fendant was awarded 2,000 dollars for the value of its leasehold, and
3,000 dollars for the reasonable costs of removing the equipment. It
then sued plaintiff in replevin and recovered the equipment on the
ground that it was personal property which had not been condemned.
The present action is to recover 3,000 dollars, as the cost of removing and storing the equipment. The lower court held for the
plaintiff and awarded 1,000 dollars as the reasonable value. This was
reversed by the court of appeals. First, it held that the condemnation
and replevin actions were res judicata; 2 but then disregarding this

holding it proceeded on to the position that the plaintiff could not
recover anyhow. The lower court had stated that the defendant had
been unjustly enriched. The court of appeals responded: "This may
be true, but even if true, we think it is wholly immaterial; and
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; author, Cases and Materials on

Restitution (1958).
1. 381 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1964).
2. In the condemnation case, the plaintiff was not a party, but the court held that
it was bound because in privity with the state. In the replevin case the court held
that Gulf was entitled to the property and denied a lien on it for Forcum. The two

cases clearly establish Gulf's right to the property, but it is a little difficult to see
how they settled the 'separate problem presented in the present case, of whether
Forcum should be compensated for the cost of removing the equipment.
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especially so as this is a law case and not a suit in equity." 3 The
reason given is that "the facts of this case do not meet the requirements of an implied contract." Most of the selections quoted deal
with a contract implied in fact, which is an actual contract, and which
was clearly not present here. If recovery is to be allowed, it is on the
basis of quasi-contract, or "contract implied in law," an obligation imposed by the law to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant
at the plaintiff's expense. The confusion of the two ideas here shows
once again that the expression, implied contract, is very likely to be
misleading and should be avoided in the interest of accurate terminology.4 But the court in this case is also holding that an action will
not lie in restitution for the unjust enrichment of the defendant.
No cases directly in point have been found. There is an analogy in
the cases where one person has placed improvements on the land of
another under the mistaken belief that he was the owner of the land.
While the majority rule. is that an action cannot be maintained to
recover the value of the improvements, many courts do allow the
action at common law and many states have passed so-called betterment statutes.5 Tennessee follows the general rule in holding that a
person who seeks the aid of equity to recover his property must compensate for the value of the improvements,' and that the value of
improvements may also be set off against any rents and profits." And
the state has also held that when a railroad placed a depot on land
it thought it owned and then had to take the land by eminent domain,
the compensation paid to the owner would not include the value of
the building.8 Perhaps an even closer analogy may be drawn to the
cases where one party cuts timber on land he thought he owned and
takes it to market. It is held that the owner can replevy it there and
need not pay for the costs of transporting it to market, but if he
sues in trover and receives money, he can recover only the value of
the timber where cut and not the value at the market. 9
A composite picture is that while courts are somewhat hesitant to
force a man to pay for improvements which he might not have
3. 381 S.W.2d at 527.
4. See, e.g., WOODWARD, QUAsI CONTRACTS

§ 4 (1913).

5. See RESTATEmENT, RESTrrTUnON § 42 (1937). The leading case allowing recovery
is the opinion of Justice Story in Bright v. Boyd, 4 Fed. Cas. 127 (No. 1875) (C.C.
Me. 1841). For relevant statutes in Tennessee, see TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1328,
-1330 (1956).
6. Howard v. Massengale, 81 Tenn. 577 (1884); Sequatchie Coal Co. v. Sunshino
Coal & Coke Co., 25 Tenn. App. 604, 166 S.W.2d 402 (M.S. 1942).
7. See McKinley v. Holliday, 18 Tenn. 477 (1837).
8. Southern Ry. v. Pouder, 141 Tenn. 197, 208 S.W. 332 (1919).
9. Gaskins v. Davis, 115 N.C. 85, 20 S.E. 188 (1894).
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wanted and which might prove a serious burden to bim,1° they will
afford compensation if they can find a way of doing it without forcing
an undesired benefit on him or if they can apportion the value of the
benefit without putting a burden on him. The instant case seems to
be one where that could have been done. In the first place, the
defendant had to remove the fixtures in any event if he was to
preserve them. This was not an unnecessary benefit. In the second
place, the defendant had been paid by the state for this very purpose
a sum three times the amount awarded to the plaintiff. There is no
unreasonable burden placed on the defendant. The decision of the
lower court seems quite reasonable, and might well have been sustained on principle, though there are no authorities directly in point.
II. SEnvicEs REND BD

Two cases involve recovery in quantum meruit for services rendered.
In Slesinger v. Glatt," the defendant owned land which she had
leased through the plaintiff, a real estate broker, to the DX Sunray
Oil Co.for ten years, with an option to purchase for the same amount
as that offered in any bona fide offer which the lessor was willing to
accept. DX showing no particular interest in purchasing, defendant
orally asked plaintiff to find a suitable purchaser. Plaintiff found a
purchaser who offered 27,500 dollars; and defendant signed an agreement to sell, subject to the DX option. Defendant gave the requisite
notice to DX and it then decided to exercise its option. Defendant
refused to pay a commission to the plaintiff. In a suit for the commission the chancellor below held for the defendant on the ground
that the plaintiff knew of the option and therefore did his work
subject to the risk that it would be exercised.
The court of appeals reversed. It indicated frst that the oral contract should probably be construed to allow recovery here; 12 but then
assumed that plaintiffs performance did not come within the terms
of the actual contract, and held that plaintiff might recover on an
"implied contract." This is obviously quasi contract because the
court declared: "In our opinion Mrs. Glatt would be unjustly enriched
to be permitted to retain the benefits of the services of Mr. Slesinger
without paying a reasonable compensation therefor."13 It took judicial
10. For a strong expression of this position, see Isle Royale Mining Co. v. Hertin,
37 Mich. 332 (1877).
11. 373 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1962).
12. This would depend first on whether the broker's undertaking was merely to
find a willing purchaser or to arrange for a consummated sale, and second on whether
the knowledge of the lessee's option meant that the claim for commission was subject
to it too.

13. 373 S.W.2d at 225.
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notice that 5 per cent (the amount of the oral contract) was a
reasonable compensation; but held that there would be no recovery
for a second lot which the plaintiff's purchaser had offered to buy
but which was not in the option and which was not sold to anyone.
In Kennon v. Commercial Standard Insurance Co.,1 4 the plaintiff
performed services in investigation of a workman's compensation claim
for defendant. Apparently there was no agreement as to the compensation, and defendant submitted a bill for 3,005.62 dollars, which
defendant refused to pay. There was much testimony as to the value
of the services and the court of appeals modified the chancellor's
figure of 2,500 dollars and set it at 1,500 dollars, saying that when
there is no agreement as to the compensation, the plaintiff recovers
in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services. It is
not clear whether the court regarded this as a contract implied in fact
to pay the reasonable value, or as a quasi contract based on unjust
enrichment.
III. RESCIssION
Kyker v. General Motors Corp.'5 was an action for rescission of a
contract of sale for an automobile, brought against the local dealer
and the manufacturer. The jury found for the dealer and against the
manufacturer. The supreme court recognized that rescission is an
appropriate remedy for breach of warranty, but held that it could
not be available here for two reasons. First, the Sales Act, with its
provisions, applied only to the buyer and seller and not to the
manufacturer, 16 and second the jury verdict was inconsistent. If there
was a verdict for the dealer on the ground that he did not breach
the warranty, then the manufacturer could not have breached it
either.
IV. LEGAL COMPULSION

Southern Coal & Coke Co. v. Beech Grove Mining Co. 17 involves
a suit for indemnity. The plaintiff acted as sales agent for the defendant in submitting a bid to the Union Carbide Nuclear Co. for the
supply of coal, filling a producer's statement. The contract was subject to the Walsh-Healey Act requiring the contractor to pay a minimum wage. Defendant paid more than this amount while it was
14. 376 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963).
15. 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964).
16. This action was under the Uniform Sales Act which was then in effect, and
which specifically provides for rescission. The Uniform Commercial Code, now in
. §§ 47-2-601, -711
effect, also provides for this type of relief. See TENN. CODE ANNm
(repl. vol. 1964).
17. 381 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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strip mining, but later, when it had to engage in deep mining, it paid
less. The United States Government charged a violation of the act,
and plaintiff, under a non-delegable duty because of its producer's
statement, had to pay the statutory penalty. In this action for
indemnity, the court of appeals gave credence to the plaintiffs testimony that it did not know of the defendant's violation, and held for
the plaintiff. It expressly found that the factual situation came within
section 76 of the Restatement of Restitution which provides:
A person who in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by
him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged
by the other, is entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is

barred by the wrongful nature of his conduct.
As between the two parties, it said, the defendant "should bear the
brunt," It also held the clean-hands doctrine inapplicable.
In three cases a taxpayer brought action to recover taxes which it
had been required to pay and which it claimed were not properly
imposed. 18 The court recognized that this was an appropriate form
of relief and held for the taxpayer in two of the cases. 19 Somewhat
similar is another case involving a suit by members of a cooperative
for a refund of excess charges for electric current. 20 The court held
that restitution would not be available until they had exhausted their
remedies within the cooperative.
V. RECEIT OF MONEY FOR ANoTER
In re Russelrs Estate2 1 involved a suit by a niece against her uncle's
estate on the ground that he had collected rents from her property.
The court found as a fact that he had collected the rents and had
not paid them over, and it granted restitution. This comes within
section 124 of the Restatement.22
18. Gallagher v. Butler, 378 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. 1964) (income tax on stock);
Genesco, Inc. v. Butler, 377 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1964) (excise tax); Tennessee Trailways, Inc. v. Butler, 373 S.W.2d 201 (Tenn. 1963) (privilege tax).
19. Genesco, Inc. v. Butler, supranote 18; Gallagher v. Butler, supra note 18.
20. Davis v. Appalachian Elec. Co-op., Inc., 373 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1964).
21. 373 S.W.2d 226 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1961).
22. "A person who, acting or purporting to act on account of another, has received
property from a third person for the other, is under a duty to account to the other

for such property."

IBESTATEmENT, REsTrrrtON

§ 124 (1937).

